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Abstract
In Europe traffic congestions make it impossible to estimate travel time. The increasing number of
cars calls for a transportation policy towards an improved efficiency of the transportation system.
However, extending road infrastructure to reduce the congestion externality implies another type of
externality, air pollution. Designing a transportation policy in industrialized countries one has to
consider this trade-off. Our objective is to investigate the role of transportation services and their
prices within an interindustry framework. The authority wishes to minimize total cost of production
with respect to the provision of infrastructure subject to an emission standard. By omitting a financial
constraint to finance infrastructure we determine the size of infrastructure where no congestion
occurs. The productivity effect of infrastructure and the cost savings from a dissolved congestion
determine the optimal stock of infrastructure. Our congestion index is unity in that case of no financial
constraint. If the extension of infrastructure has to be paid for by taxation, we obtain a lower level of
infrastructure. In view of the trade-off between the benefit of a productivity gain from a dissolved
congestion and the deadweight loss from taxation this lower level of infrastructure will result in an
index of congestion higher than unity, implying a negative externality to the economy.
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1. Introduction*
In Europe, and especially in Germany, traffic congestions make it impossible to estimate travel time.
The increasing number of cars and the location of Germany in the center of Europe call for a
transportation policy to improve the efficiency of our transportation system.1 However, extending
road infrastructure to improve mobility and to reduce congestions implies another type of externality,
air pollution. This trade-off will have to be considered for a transportation policy in industrialized
countries. For decades the literature on congestion type externalities has suggested congestion tolling
or highway tolls as instruments to correct congestion externalities (Walters (1961), Mohring (1965),
Vickrey (1967), Wheaton (1978) and Wilson (1983)). The argument is that the price of private
motor vehicle usage is well below its social marginal cost. In spite of this, there are no highway tolls
in Germany. An alternative to the introduction of a toll system at a high cost would be an increase in
the gasoline tax with the advantage of lower transaction cost.
In addition to using price levers, the flow of traffic could also be improved by an extension of
the road infrastructure. However, this also needs a price instrument for its financing. The problem of
an optimal capacity determination under congestion externalities has been analyzed in Mohring
(1970), Wheaton (1978) and D’Ouville and McDonald (1990). In these papers capacity affects the
                                                                
* I am grateful to three anonymous referees for many helpful suggestions.
3variable costs of the input „road service flow“ and the question of how to finance the extension of the
capacity leads to the distinction between first-best and second-best rules of extending highway
capacity. The capacity determination of infrastructure is first-best, if the extension moves along with a
congestion toll. Without the consideration of a congestion toll and the environmental impact of road
traffic, marginal costs of road usage are below social marginal costs and a second-best extension of
capacity, purely based on demand, takes place.
The size of the optimal capacity of infrastructure depends, of course, on the assumptions
made in the corresponding models. In most models the service flow of road infrastructure enters only
the utility function of the consumers (Mohring (1970), Wheaton (1978), Wilson (1983)). In view of
the steadily increasing transportation by trucks with the just-in-time philosophy as the main source of
congestion externality, a cost and production approach like D’Ouville and McDonald (1990) seems
to be as relevant as a consumer model. However, the relevance of infrastructure and the congestion
externality is usually neglected in the literature. The analysis of infrastructure and congestion is the
objective of this paper. One of our main concerns is the trade-off between savings in private costs as
a result of a good provision of transportation infrastructure and the related increase in social
congestion costs from the more intensive usage of infrastructure (more trips per person and more
motorvehicles). This aspect is investigated by Gronau (1994), where again the travelling consumer is
the object of the analysis but not transportation as an input of the production process. In the urban
economic literature models of consumers caught in the daily rush-hour traffic can be found (e.g.
McConnell and Straszheim (1982)), but no economy-wide approaches are available dealing with
trucks as an input and its possibility of substitution by other modes of transportation.
A third dimension has to be added to the two already mentioned dimensions - the trade-off
between private gain in productivity from more infrastructure, and the resulting increase in congestion
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4- namely environmental pollution. Decisions about capacity extension, the need to finance this (e. g.
by a higher gasoline tax) and also decisions about the determination of emission standards have to be
made simultaneously.
Our objective is to investigate the role of transportation services and their prices within an
interindustry framework. We are not interested in traffic as a local problem2 but in its role as an
important intermediate input, as a main air pollutor and in its general equilibrium effect on the
performance of an economy (see for example: van den Bergh (1993), van den Bergh and Nijkamp
(1993) and Mayeres and Proost (1994)). Van den Bergh (1993) investigates the relationship
between freight transportation, production and consumption in a two-sector equilibrium model. In
addition to the objective of cost minimization in the production of transportation services, and the
modeling of supply and demand of transportation services subject to congestion externalities, van
den Bergh makes an attempt to integrate spacial aspects into a computable general equilibrium model
(CGE) as well. This integration of CGE models with a multiregional transportation analysis (for the
latter see Liew and Liew (1991)) is a first step towards a comprehensive quantitative study on
transportation policy.
However, modeling congestion externalities is only sketched in van den Bergh, and
infrastructure is exogeneous and not an instrument of a transportation policy. In van den Bergh and
Nijkamp infrastructure is endogeneous and the economic costs of the transportation system are
taken into account. The modeling of the effects of congestion and infrastructure is not yet
satisfactory. The negative externalities, environment and congestion, are not treated separately. The
paper elaborates theoretical elements for a general equilibrium analysis without building a CGE
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5model. The work by Mayeres and Proost is the closest to ours. They use a simple CGE model to
demonstrate the introduction of an optimal taxation of congestion externalities. One of the taxes is a
toll on traffic flow in peak-load hours. As in our model infrastructure is an instrument to dissolve
congestion. However, our methodological approach is to endogenize the size of the congestion
externality and to find the determinants for an optimal extension of infrastructure. In that, we will
differ from their procedure.
We begin our construction of a CGE model with a multi-input production function where
aggregated transportation services are one of the inputs (section 2). Its components are ship, railway,
purchased truck services and firm owned trucks treated as quasi-fixed capital input. Within the input
structure of our input-output table an industry can use its own transportation equipment or it can
purchase services from the suppliers of alternative modes of transportation. There are therefore also
industries which use their transportation capital to supply transportation services. For all industries
the congestion externality has an output reducing effect. From the duality in the theory of cost and
production one can derive a variable cost function for transportation with equipment for
transportation as a quasi-fix capital stock and congestion as cost increasing externality. From
Shephard’s Lemma we obtain price-dependent input coefficients for the four transportation modes.
From the envelope condition the optimal stock of transportation equipment can be derived and can
be compared with the actual one (section 3).
In a first step we minimize the total cost of production given the infrastructure and the
congestion externality subject to a NOx emission standard (section 4). From this centralized solution
we can derive a price lever as an instrument to make a decentralized solution of this problem
possible. In a second step we abandon the assumption of proportionality of stocks and flows and
make the service flow of transportation equipment dependent on its stock and the provision of
6infrastructure. The authority now minimizes total cost of production with respect to the provision of
infrastructure subject to an emission standard (section 5). By omitting a financial constraint for the
provision of infrastructure we determine the size of infrastructure when no congestion occurs. The
emission standard and the productivity effect of infrastructure as well as the cost savings from a
dissolved congestion determine the optimal stock of infrastructure. Our congestion index is unity in
that case. In a next step we introduce a financial constraint for extending infrastructure in terms of a
gasoline tax. In view of a trade-off between the benefit of a productivity gain from a dissolved
congestion and the deadweight loss from energy taxation, this level of infrastructure will be below the
optimal one where financial constraints have been neglected. In that case our index of congestion is
higher than unity, implying a negative externality.
2. Cost function and input coefficients for the aggregated inputs
We characterize the technology of a cost minimizing industry by nested CES cost functions. C(X,
PK, PL, PE, PM, PT) is the cost function at the first stage with input prices for capital, labor,
energy, material and transportation. Our production function is therefore assumed to be CES in the
corresponding inputs. Figure 1 shows the nested production structure.
Insert Fig. 1
Profit maximization under constant returns to scale implies revenue PX×X equal to cost which
explains the output price PX of domestic production in terms of a CES unit cost function:
PX d PK d PL d PE d PM d PTK L E M Tx x x x x x= × + × + × + × + ×
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7From Shephard’s Lemma we derive the factor demand functions as variable input coefficients:
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In principle, one could include all the input prices of the model in one CES unit cost function. This,
however, would imply the assumption, that the elasticity of substitution is the same between all inputs.
We therefore specify subcost functions for the energy aggregate, the material aggregate and the
transport aggregate with different elasticities of substitution. The price function for the energy
aggregate at the second level is:
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The price-dependent composition of the energy aggregate is:
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In order to determine the fuel input coefficient, one has to multiply (4) by (2) with i = E.
We furthermore have a unit cost function for material in its m components, similar to (3) and with
input coefficients, analogous to (4). Similarly, we choose a CES specification for the unit cost
function for transportation. This function is, however, more complex and consists of a variable unit
cost function based on a CES variable cost function with a service flow KT from the industry’s
capital stock of transportation equipment. This service flow is quasi-fixed and depends, as will be
explained later, on the stock of transportation capital and on road infrastructure.
The subproduction function for T is:
T d T d T d T d KT ZT T T T= × + × + × + × ×
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8where Z ³ 1 is a congestion index the construction of which will also be explained later.3 Then the
variable cost function is
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The unit cost function for the intermediate good transportation is
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where PKT is the user cost price of the service KT and will also be explained later.
From the derivatives of the cost function CT we obtain the cost-minimizing allocation of
transportation to its three variable components:
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If a better infrastructure or a higher stock of vehicles in an industry increases the service flow KT,
then the input coefficients (9) decline because a better service from the firm’s own trucks reduces the
demand for the substitutes T1,  T2 and T3.
The demand for the transportation service KT will be modeled in the next section. If we
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9multiply the overall input coefficient by the sub-input coefficient we obtain the input coefficients ai:
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The ( )×  indicates that the coefficients depend on relative prices. In a CGE analysis for measuring the
impact of transportation policy, the prices influence the input structure A = (aij) as well as final
demand FD. The solution of the system x = Ax + FD yields the output vector x of the economy.
3. The effect of traffic congestion on the cost of production
If an industry requires transportation as an input in producing its output, it can choose among the
services of trucks, ships or trains, or it can use its own stock of transportation equipment. Let KTj
o
be the stock of trucks in industry j; its service flow KTj depends on this stock as well as on the
availability of infrastructure KI. We express this relation by KT KT KT KIj j j=
o,c h and assume the
specification:
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where KI ® ¥ implies a full utilization of the stock KTj
0 .
In section 2 we have assumed KTj
o  and KI to be fixed, and specified a CES production
